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 In his paper “How to Solve Moral Conundrums with Computability Theory”, 
Jongmin Jerome Baek proposes a framework to better deal with various moral problems 
by reducing value statements to a logical format. He begins the paper by briefly 
contextualizing the history of computability theory in moral philosophy. He introduces 
Gӧdel’s Incompleteness Theorem which he formulates roughly as showing that 
“consistency and completeness cannot coexist in a formal system”. He criticises this 
approach in past applications because it has been used to prove both the existence and 
nonexistence of God and both the possibility and impossibility of a fully conscious A.I., 
but states that such applications have been misinterpretations of the ideals. He states 
that a proper interpretation of such a theory claims that when we know something we 
change the way in which the knowledge is classified; the limits of that knowledge are 
broadened, introducing more avenues for understanding. In a practical sense, once we 
know something we can use it to gain more information. He then uses formal language 
to describe the way that knowledge acts in this way, coining it uncomputable. He states 
that free will is uncomputable because of this paradox of gaining knowledge. The belief 
than free will is good, then uncomputability is good. As a result, the moral value 
statements we make are incomplete. When we label something as morally good we are 
doing so because the uncomputable process we are using has been previously deemed 
successful in producing accurate judgements. However, the implications of Gӧdel’s 
Incompleteness Theorem mean that if we know that the process is good to begin with, 
that same process cannot predict anything that is better than the previous good. With 
this understanding, he addresses moral questions like what is a good life and how 
should we concern ourselves with future generations.  
 The paper takes an admittedly highly formal (as in logical) approach to the 
classification of moral principles. However, it notes that this classification relies on a 
contradiction. It is not uncommon for the primary classifier of a notion to be a 
contradiction and does not in itself provide worry for the fallibility of the claim. However, 
once concern that he might want to address is whether or not what follows after the 
classification is acted on by that contradiction. He notes the difficulty that one would 
have using such a theorem to describe what is good, in fact it is impossible to fully know 
what is good. As a result the classification of a process as uncomputable, and therefore 
good, would be equally difficult, if fact impossible. If one cannot determine which 
processes are uncomputable then the value judgement needed is exposed by the same 
contradiction that it draws its power from. It is the paradox of the chicken and the egg. 
How can you determine a process that can be defined as uncomputable, without using 
a process that is equally uncomputable? But then how do you determine whether or not 
that process is uncomputable? 
 This objection could make the classification seem to be a non starter when the 
epistemology of moral values are questioned. However, once this objection is quelled, 
the implications that it has on moral problems is indeed interesting.  
 In addition, I believe that the questions answered toward the end should play a 
larger role in the presentation. The implications of such a classification better lend 
themselves to a presentation than the classification itself.  
